Empty Words

The Moment of Direct Realization

2007-04-14T08:55:00.000-04:00

The Prasangika presentation of the path to enlightenment is encapsulated in one defining moment: a direct realization of emptiness. This one moment is the quintessential experience of the entire path and thus serves as a pivot on which the whole Prasangika method rotates. This experience is revered as a pure, unfiltered glimpse of ultimate truth – a perception of the true nature of reality. It represents the culmination of one’s conceptual understanding of emptiness and the dawning of non-conceptual insight. And because of its ultimate reliability, this experience is taken as the definitive arbiter when determining which minds are capable of discerning truth. In other words, the direct experience of emptiness is seen to establish both ultimate truth and the validity of the mind that realizes ultimate truth. On the foundation of these two established premises, the entire Prasangika path is constructed so as to lead the student to that direct experience.

For many years now, i have found it curious that so much emphasis is placed on this one moment along the path to enlightenment. If it really is a path, then how can one section of the path be elevated above all the rest? Every journey will have some moments that are more memorable than others but the success of the journey depends equally on the all the steps that we take. How can we say that any particular moment is the “real experience” of the journey?

And even more suspicious is the fact that the one moment which is held up as a direct realization of ultimate truth does not occur at the end of the path, as we would expect, but somewhere in the middle. After this direct glimpse of emptiness there are experiences that must be cultivated before enlightenment is reached. This begs the question of why an incomplete experience of enlightenment, which comes at an intermediate stage of the path, is adopted as a realization of the true nature of reality and why such a (not yet fully-matured) state of mind is the assumed standard-bearer of a valid mind. Surely the mind of enlightenment perceives nuances of truth that are not perceived by an initial realization of emptiness and surely the mind of enlightenment is a more appropriate candidate for the prototypical “valid mind”. So why is the path structured around a direct realization of emptiness instead of around the mind of enlightenment?

A more wide-ranging question is: If we over-accentuate one section of the path to enlightenment, how would that effect our understanding of the entire path? What distortions and exaggerations might we expect to find? For example, if someone were attempting to climb Mt. Everest and he focused all his energies on reaching a temporary shelter half way to the peak, how would that effect his efforts to get all the way to the top? If he spent almost all of his time and attention on trying to get to the temporary shelter under the assumption that the trek from the shelter to the peak would be effortless, would he be prepared for the second half of the journey?

There are good reasons for emphasizing the importance of a direct realization of emptiness – beyond the belief that it is an instance of a completely valid mind observing ultimate reality. However, we also need to understand the limitations and deceptive nature of this experience. Perhaps most important is that a direct realization of emptiness is the direct realization of something which is assumed to be partial. It is a direct realization of an emptiness that is assumed to exist separately from conventional truths. Up until the meditator experiences a direct realization, he has been meditating on an emptiness that has been conceptually distinguished from all other phenomena. This emptiness does not actually exist because the two truths are the same nature; emptiness only exists in union with conventional truths. Thus, if the meditator realizes “only emptiness” without simultaneously realizing conventional truth then he has realized a false emptiness.

The direct realization of emptiness is the core of the Prasangika method but we should not accept everything that is said about this experience as a literal truth. We need to investigate this event based on our personal experience and come to our own understanding.

Reflecting Truth

2007-03-31T13:08:00.000-04:00

What makes emptiness different from other phenomena? What distinguishes the concept of emptiness from other concepts? I have written about this topic before but it is very interesting and i think it is the key to understanding the meaning of emptiness. It is not enough simply to gain a rough understanding of emptiness, we need to understand how emptiness relates to and resembles other concepts.

Yesterday, i was thinking about how emptiness is like a mirror. Although we often think about emptiness as a “phenomenon” – an object of mind – it does not have any characteristics that can be used to identify it and distinguish it from other phenomena. Emptiness does not present a unique appearance that we can learn to see, like learning to “see” the force of gravity; it merely reflects back to us our own projections and preconceptions. It is like looking into a mirror: we clearly see something and therefore assume that something real is there. The appearance of the object is correct but our belief about why it is appearing or where it is coming from is wrong. We assume that its appearance indicates that it is coming from itself, “out there” (on the other side of the mirror) and we do not realize that its appearance is actually coming from here, from our world on this side of the mirror. We do not think that we are looking at our self and our world; we think that we are looking at other things, things outside of our world. Emptiness is not something to be perceived, it is the fact that everything we are perceiving is a reflection of our current situation.

And yet, this is not the whole story for even if we accept that emptiness represents the boundary of our (present) experience, we can still wonder about what is beyond that boundary. Once we realize that the things we are seeing are not real but are just reflections in a mirror, we might then ask what exists behind the mirror. Of course, whatever we find “behind the mirror” will also be a reflection of our experience but that does not mean that the inquiry is meaningless.

The problem is that by merely asking the question “What exists behind the mirror?” we cease to be deceived by the reflected appearances and automatically consolidate our perception of reflection into a thing (a mirror) which is limited and therefore can be mentally transcended. The same process of consolidation and objectification occurs when we describe emptiness in terms of being a phenomenon. When we portray emptiness in this way it begs the question of what characteristics and properties this “thing” has. What distinguishes it from other phenomena? What are its limitations? What makes it relative to other things? It also conveys the impression that there is something more than emptiness, that we can go beyond or “look behind” emptiness – which of course conflicts with the belief that emptiness is ultimate truth.

I think a complete understanding of emptiness depends on understanding this dual nature. Emptiness is neither just “ultimate” truth nor just a relative, conventional truth. It is both. And it is necessary to understand both of these aspects in order to realize the union of the two truths. But what is really beautiful is that all phenomena are both ultimate and conventional truths. Everything is a manifestation of ultimate truth (which can be discovered upon analysis) and everything is a conventional truth because it can only be defined in relationship to other phenomena. In other words, there is nothing that distinguishes emptiness from any other phenomenon except for its conventional characteristics. Emptiness is not a special concept. It does not contain any special meaning or truth that other concepts lack. It may have a unique definition but all phenomena have a unique definition and the truth that is realized by meditating on emptiness is the result of one’s unflinching analysis, not the effect of believing in a privileged concept. Emptiness is the true nature of all phenomena… but we do not need to know emptiness in order to realize it.

The Unmentionable

2007-02-05T10:45:00.000-05:00

Emptiness is the unmentionable truth. It is the ultimate ground of reality, the foundation from which all appearances arise, and the source from which all phenomena manifest. But emptiness itself is not a thing. It is not a phenomenon, it is not something that can be conceived and defined by the conceptual mind, and it is not something that can be expressed with language. By nature of being the ultimate, fundamental truth, it is confined to the background of reality. It is the fabric from which reality is woven and so can never be pointed out as a “thing”, or a part, within reality. Thus, emptiness must forever remain implicit, unconceived, and inexpressible. It may pervade every corner of our world but it is the Unmentionable, the one thing that is distorted and corrupted by the mere act of attempting to articulate it.

The problem is that if we want to fully realize this “ultimate nature of reality,” we first need to identify it, which requires conceiving, naming, and defining emptiness. However, it is important to keep in mind that this process of describing emptiness is merely a teaching device. Its sole purpose is to illustrate emptiness for the novice student so that he or she will eventually realize its unmentionable nature. The practice of presenting emptiness as an distinct phenomenon—a “thing” that can be known, named, and particularized—should not be assumed to mean that emptiness exists as a discrete entity in contradistinction to other phenomena. Explaining the idea of God to a child by saying that God is an old man who lives in the sky does not mean that God actually exists in that way; it is just a useful way of presenting a profound concept to a simple mind.

Once we identify emptiness, however, we need to proceed to reconcile this phenomenon with all the other conventional things that occupy our lives. This practice, known as unifying the two truths, depends on learning how emptiness and other phenomena can mutually exist without exaggerating one and denying the relative validity of the other. In other words, once we have conceived emptiness and brought it into our world as a unique entity we have to find its proper place in relation to all the other things in our world.

For most students of emptiness it might seem that the proper place for emptiness is front and center, at the forefront of our consciousness and at the center of our attention. This is understandable considering the strong emphasis that Buddhist teachers and texts place on emptiness. Also, a genuine realization of emptiness can require many years of dedicated study and meditation and such concentrated effort would only be possible if emptiness were kept “front and center” in the student’s awareness throughout his training. However, when emptiness is granted status as an individual phenomenon in relation to other phenomena, we exaggerate the proper place of emptiness and fail to understand the union of the two truths. The mere identification of emptiness within a context of conventional phenomena implies something that it is not: a phenomenon with conventional characteristics that can be conceived, defined, and named in relationship to other phenomena. Rather than being a conventional thing like everything else, emptiness is like the space between conventional things: present only in an implicit, negative way.

The proper place for emptiness is the background of reality. As the ultimate truth and true nature of all phenomena, it necessarily remains behind the scenes, providing the existential basis for all things but forever hidden from view. It cannot even be said to exist for we cannot ascribe any qualities to it without evoking it into the domain of conventional truths. All our attempts to know it and describe it only succeed in creating a conventional truth called “emptiness.” The ultimate truth that we seek refuses to be known or named; it is unmentionable.

Before we encounter teachings on emptiness, emptiness is an unknown phenomenon. Although it may be the ultimate truth of all phenomena, we have no knowledge of it. Then, by studying the teachings on emptiness, we learn to identify it. We mentally carve it out of our reality by conceiving it, defining it, and understanding it in relation to other phenomena: “It is the mere lack of inherent existence. It’s like empty space but it’s not nothingness. It’s permanent. It’s a negative phenomenon. Etc.” In this way, emptiness becomes a known phenomenon. Eventually, with diligent study and meditation, emptiness becomes so familiar to us that it is as real and tangible as conventional truths. At this point, our understanding of emptiness as an individual phenomenon—a thing—is complete. The reality of emptiness has been incontrovertibly established in our mind. Our study and meditation has succeeded in convincing us of the undeniable reality of emptiness and, once this point is reached, no amount of study or analysis will make emptiness any more true, substantial, or factual. This may appear to be the end of one’s training in emptiness but, actually, this stage, at which one’s understanding of emptiness itself becomes more or less complete, represents a turning point and a halfway mark on the path to realizing our true goal: the union of the two truths.

The reason that a complete understanding of emptiness itself does not mark our final destination is that it leads to a sort of ontological crisis between emptiness and conventional truths which must be resolved if we hope to extract the meaning of emptiness from our private meditation and incorporate it into our life in the world. The basic problem is that once emptiness is established in our mind as a real and true phenomenon, it appears that emptiness and conventional truths are incompatible. As we develop a sense of the equal realness of emptiness and conventional truths, it seems that we are forced to choose between them. This dilemma is the principal challenge for the practice of unifying the two truths and, again, the practice of unifying the two truths primarily depends on understanding their relationship—finding their respective places in our experience of reality.

When considering the proper place for emptiness we may be inclined to grant emptiness precedence over conventional truths, or perhaps try to maintain both on the same level—equal opponents locked in constant tension. However, these uninspired attempts at a “union” of the two truths fail to appreciate the purpose and significance of presenting emptiness as a thing with its own characteristics. Emptiness is depicted as a “phenomenon” in order to help us draw it out of (non)existence and then use as a contrast to conventional truths so that we can, through a process of comparison and reconciliation, gradually develop an understanding of the true nature of conventional truths. Emptiness is described as if it were a thing, but it’s not. The thing-ness of emptiness is an artificial fabrication that is designed to induce the above “ontological crisis” in the mind of the student so that he will be forced to question and examine his beliefs about the nature of conventional phenomena. The creation of emptiness-as-a-phenomenon leads to the unavoidable confrontation of emptiness vs. conventional truths, which can only be resolved by investigating and discovering the true nature of things. Thus, the concept of emptiness as a phenomenon is a philosophical prop—a pragmatic tool that is used to lead the student’s mind into a philosophical quandary. In this case, that quandary is the question of the nature of existence.

Emptiness is not actually a thing in the way that conventional truths are things because emptiness is merely the mode of existence of things, not a thing itself. It is an answer to the question of how things exist not an answer to the question of what exists. We could say that emptiness is a false phenomenon. The teachings on emptiness describe it as if it were a phenomenon but we must keep in mind that this description is merely provided for the benefit of our limited understanding; it is not intended to be a definitive statement about the nature of emptiness.

If we remember that emptiness is a false phenomenon while attempting to unify the two truths, it will be easier to reach a resolution. Or rather, we will be able to recognize that in fact there is no conflict, no incompatibility, that needs to be resolved. Since emptiness is not a thing, it contains no qualities or characteristics that could clash with conventional truths. “In emptiness there is no form, no feeling, no discrimination, no compositional factors, no consciousness. There is no eye, no ear, no nose, no tongue, no body, no mentality; no form, no sound, no smell, no taste, no tactile object, no phenomenon…” When viewed in comparison to conventional truths, emptiness has no distinguishing features and indeed has no appearance at all. It would appear that emptiness does not even exist! It is this nonappearance or nonexistence of emptiness that marks the union of the two truths for only when emptiness fades invisibly into the background of reality do we cease to experience a conflict between ultimate truth and conventional truths. Thus, the proper place for emptiness is nowhere (or everywhere?!)—a place where it is not seen, heard, or felt, a place where it remains permanently non-localized, a place where it can suffuse and permeate all phenomena without being limited to any one phenomenon, a place where it remains forever hidden unless we decide to draw it out of reality. We could say that emptiness is the formless, existential context of conventional truths. It does not really consist of anything; it is a name without a reference.

The objective of the practice of the union of the two truths is to allow emptiness to return to its proper place by learning how to let it become more and more invisible, without denying its reality. At the beginning of our study, our efforts are focused on drawing emptiness out of the unknown: conceptualizing emptiness, making it an explicitly known phenomenon that has a certain definition and meaning, and treating it like a thing. But once this has been accomplished and emptiness is established in our mind as a real entity, we then need to learn how emptiness naturally exists without being sculpted or molded into existence in any form, even thought-forms. We need to allow emptiness to recede back into the unknown from which we created it while somehow maintaining an understanding of its significance. We need to reach a state in which the meaning of emptiness has been so thoroughly internalized, so deeply imbedded into our mind, that it appears as if emptiness does not exist at all. As Chandrakirti says, we need to “see emptiness by not seeing it.”

As you might imagine, this practice of becoming so familiar with emptiness that it appears to fade away requires great spiritual integrity. The practitioner who is learning to unify the two truths must be willing to patiently abide within the tension between the two truths until his mind has surrendered the desire to escape from that tension by grasping at the extremes of existence or nonexistence. Furthermore, he must mold his faith, discipline, and other virtues to the specific needs of his task. For instance, he must develop faith in an unseen and unknown emptiness. In the beginning of his study, the practitioner’s faith in emptiness is predominantly based on reasoning and conceptual understanding; he only believes in the emptiness to the extent that he can logically prove that it exists. However, with a direct realization of emptiness followed by the practice of unifying the two truths, the practitioner must learn to relinquish his reliance on the conceptual forms of emptiness and develop faith in a formless, nonconceptual version of emptiness. He must also cultivate a commensurate form of mental discipline which resists the compulsive tendency to express emptiness in conceptual form. He must learn to accept that emptiness “just is” without yielding to the conceptual mind’s demand to know precisely what emptiness is. He must accept that emptiness is inexpressible, indefinable, and unknowable and resist the temptation to express it, define it, and know it. He must learn to be satisfied with the unmentionable nature of emptiness.

Reason and Transcendence: A Response to Stephen Batchelor

2006-10-27T13:43:00.000-04:00

[The following is a response to Stephen Batchelor’s blog-post, Reason and Transcendence (2), which can be found on Tricycle’s website.]

First of all, i want to thank Stephen for his thoughts in the Reason and Transcendence posts. They raise several questions that are important and relevant for Western Buddhists to reflect on. As someone who has spent several years wrestling with questions like these – questions that are often dismissed or ignored by some of the more dogmatic members of my Buddhist family – it is reassuring to know that other people recognize the unique dilemmas that these questions pose for Western practitioners. In particular, like Stephen, i have also been interested in and confused by the progression from a conceptual understanding of emptiness to a non-conceptual realization of emptiness. How and why does a non-conceptual experience emerge from a conceptual understanding? Although we first need to understand the traditional explanation of how and why this progression occurs, i think we also need to develop the ability to translate this experience into terms that are recognizable and meaningful to the established fields of Western epistemology and psychology.

The question of how a conceptual understanding of emptiness can transform into a non-conceptual experience is a good example of a Buddhist belief that needs to be translated into Western terms. What is the psychological explanation of this transformation? The resolution of this question has been one of the main objectives of my meditation practice in the last few years. An authoritative answer would demand not only that the practitioner experiences and completes each stage of the path to realizing emptiness but that he or she also have sufficient experience of other psychological models in order to elucidate the areas in which the two models (Buddhist and Western) either overlap or conflict with each other. While i cannot claim to have either of these requisites, my investigation so far has led me to believe that a resolution is perhaps simpler than we usually imagine.

As Stephen mentioned, Dharmakirti makes an epistemological distinction between objects that are known by the senses (evident objects) and objects that are inferred through reason (hidden objects). (As for the category of very hidden objects, perhaps it is just a faithful way of referring to things that are beyond the capacity of the human mind…) This distinction between sensory objects and conceptual objects is a mental separation of two things that actually constitute an indivisible whole: our experience of the world. The world that we experience is divided into two parts – evident objects and hidden objects – which each have a corresponding state of mind: sense perception and conceptual inference. This division is useful for conceptually understanding phenomena, such as emptiness, but it is important to recognize that it is a false separation because things that we experience do not actually exist as either ‘objects of the senses’ or ‘objects of the mind’, but as a union of both.

By separating things into categories such as ‘evident objects’ and ‘hidden objects’, we are able to refine our conceptual understanding of phenomena, which helps us clearly identify obscure concepts like emptiness. However, a merely conceptual understanding of emptiness is misleading because it is an abstracted idea separated from the reality of sensory experience. The concept of emptiness is the mental appearance of a hypothetical, abstract emptiness which supposedly points to the real emptiness. Like all concepts, the concept of emptiness is somewhat deceptive because it is the representation of emptiness instead of emptiness itself.

In order to overcome the deceptive nature of the concept of emptiness (and all concepts), we need to progress to a non-conceptual, direct experience of emptiness; we need to realize emptiness itself. Like Stephen mentioned, the traditional explanation for this progression is that single-pointed concentration is unified with a conceptual understanding of emptiness to induce a non-conceptual direct realization of emptiness. Although i accept the practical efficacy of this method, for the modern psychologist or cognitive scientist it does leave several unanswered questions. Why does such a concentrated state of mind induce a non-conceptual experience? What change is occurring in the mind at that moment of realization? What type of knowledge does a non-conceptual realization induce?

It seems to me that what we call a ‘non-conceptual realization’ is simply a act of reintegrating what has previously been conceptually divided. All of the conceptual discriminations that we make on the path to a conceptual understanding of emptiness are introduced merely for pragmatic purposes, to help us develop a clear idea of emptiness; those discriminations are not intended to be adopted as absolute definitions. Once we have clearly identified emptiness, those distinctions have fulfilled their purpose and need to be dismantled so that we can again see the world as a unified whole instead of as disparate parts. In particular, we need to deconstruct the practical, but ultimately false, dichotomy between sensory experience and conceptual experience so that we again relate to the world as one holistic experience.

This process of dissolving the conceptual distinctions that we have been utilizing is essentially non-conceptual because we are undoing our conceptual projections of how the world exists; we are non-conceptualizing our experience of the world. It is as if we are erasing all the conceptual lines that divide and fragment our uniform experience of the world into things and non-things. Contrary to our usual interpretation, we do not develop a non-conceptual state of mind which then observes and realizes emptiness because such a view implicitly separates the mind and its object, which prevents a direct and immediate experience of emptiness. This hypothetical ‘non-conceptual’ state of mind – which is presumably beyond both sense perception and rationality – is a transcendental state of mind, which we assume provides transcendental knowledge. Rather, a non-conceptual realization of emptiness is an experience in which the conceptual distinction between emptiness and other phenomena is unmade.

This unmaking of conceptual distinctions can be achieved by meditating on emptiness with a mind of deep concentration because such a concentrated mind does not experience the duality between subject and object. This mind does not relate to emptiness as an object outside itself; the mind and emptiness merge into each other. First we develop a conceptual understanding of emptiness which is implicitly dependent on projecting emptiness as an object and then, when we combine this with deep concentration, the objective quality of emptiness is undermined, which functions to neutralize its conceptually fabricated nature. Our concentration induces a de-conceptualizing experience: a non-conceptual realization.

Essentially, what we are doing is adopting a series of conceptual classifications (such as evident/hidden objects), using them to reach a clear idea of emptiness, and then discarding them. It is like drawing a line on a sheet of paper to separate it into two halves and then erasing the line to reunite the two halves into one whole. One might think that since we ultimately abandon the conceptual divisions that there is no difference between our experience prior to their adoption and our experience after their abandonment (i.e. that our experience of reality before we study emptiness is the same as our experience after we fully realize emptiness). This is worthy of debate but my feeling is that there is a difference. Although it could be argued that there is not a difference between the objects that an ordinary being realizes and the objects that a Buddha realizes, it seems to me that the process of differentiating emptiness and then reuniting it with conventional existence will add a quality to the Buddha’s experience of those objects that the ordinary being will not have. There is a difference between drawing and then erasing a line, and never having drawn the line at all.

This process can be likened to someone who lives in a village at the base of a mountain. One day he walks to the top of the mountain where he gets a very different perspective of his village and the surrounding area. At the top of the mountain, he observes the village from a distance and sees how small and insignificant it is in relation to the vastness of the countryside, which provides a stark contrast to his normal view of village life as all-important. Then he returns to the village and reintegrates with ordinary village life. From one perspective, that villager has not done anything significant; he simply went for a walk one day up a mountain that all the other villagers know and see. And, from the perspective of the other villagers, he did not do anything noteworthy because his life in the village was the same before and after climbing the mountain. However, for him there is a great difference between how he saw the village before his hike and how he saw the village after his hike. The experience of hiking to the top of the mountain gave him a broader perspective of life in the village that he didn’t have before. Although there may not be any externally recognizable change in his life, he is a changed man for having undergone the journey to the top of the mountain. Likewise, the journey to realizing emptiness – first conceptually and then non-conceptually – may not change any of the particular facts about our life but, yet, the process will completely change our life. (Of course, the change in perspective that emptiness brings will naturally lead to other more tangible changes but the point is that emptiness is not a transcendental truth that will magically create the type of life that we have always dreamed of.)

When we understand emptiness conceptually we are viewing emptiness in a reified and abstract way. We are seeing emptiness as a thing, ‘out there’, which can be observed and analysed. When we interpret a non-conceptual realization of emptiness through the eyes of the conceptual mind, we imagine that this non-conceptual realization realizes something beyond the concept of emptiness. We assume that the abstracted emptiness known by the conceptual mind is further abstracted by the non-conceptual mind. This leads to the conclusion that a direct experience of emptiness is beyond our normal understanding, inaccessible to thoughts and words. While emptiness can be very difficult to express in words, we have to be very careful to avoid the tendency to over-abstract it by supposing that it exists in a transcendent epistemological realm, inaccessible to ordinary knowledge. (I think this may be the main point of Stephen’s posts.) I believe that the reason why a profound experience of emptiness can be so difficult to articulate is because it so closely resembles our ordinary experience, not because it is a transcendental experience.

We often think of the Buddhist path of realizing emptiness as progressing in a linear fashion with the effect that we assume that our practice will take us further and further away from our present location on the line. It can be helpful to use the metaphor of travelling along a path but i think it is more accurate to visualize the path as circular because by continuing in one direction our practice eventually leads us back to where we started – though when we reach that place again it is no longer the same place because we have been transformed by the journey. In this analogy, the first half of our journey along the circle corresponds to developing a clear conceptual understanding of emptiness. During this part of the path it feels as if we are progressing farther and farther away from our original position. (Imagine starting at the uppermost point of a circle and tracing the curve on one side downwards to the lowermost point.) The second half of our journey along the circle corresponds to developing a non-conceptual experience of emptiness. This part of the path is a continuation of the first half: we progress from the lowermost point of the circle upwards along the other side of the circle until we arrive back at the starting point. Although we might expect (based on our experience of the first half) that the second half of our journey will continue to lead us farther and farther away from our starting point and culminate in some unknown (transcendental) destination, this expectation is simply the result of an unjustified preconception, an over-abstraction of emptiness. Eventually we arrive back at our original location (at the top of the circle) but, because of the process of actually undertaking the journey, it is not really the same place as it was in the beginning. Although the second, non-conceptual half of the journey functions to see through and undo the conceptual distinctions that were drawn during the first part, the process is not the same as simply retracing one’s steps backwards to return to the starting point; the process must be carried forward to completion. There is a world of difference between regressing to a simpler, more peaceful state of mind and progressing to the peaceful mind of enlightenment.

In short, a complete realization of emptiness depends on both developing a clear conceptual understanding of it and then dissolving the conceptual framework for that understanding. The construction of a conceptual understanding of emptiness depends on logical reasoning but the destruction of it is carried out by subverting the foundation of conceptual discriminations. This can be achieved with the help of deep concentration because such a concentrated mind does not support subject-object duality, the premise of all conceptuality. Although it may appear that the construction and destruction of a conceptual understanding of emptiness achieves nothing because it does not provide any new specific knowledge, the achievement derives from undergoing the process of creating and destroying that understanding.

Questioning the Answer

2006-09-23T11:32:00.000-04:00

In the process of investigating and pondering the meaning of emptiness in the last few years i have encountered a substantial amount of blind, dogmatic belief within Buddhism, especially with respect to the teachings on emptiness. Somehow, this belief in emptiness – as opposed to the living experience of it – has always felt like hypocrisy and a betrayal of the true meaning of emptiness. In my discussions with fellow practitioners i have often struggled to describe and identify this dogmatic belief in emptiness but perhaps it can be explained by considering the difference between viewing emptiness as an answer and viewing emptiness as a question.

Is emptiness an answer or a question?

Usually we interpret emptiness as an answer. It acts as an answer to questions like, “What is ultimate truth?” “What is the gateway to liberation and enlightenment?” and “What is the true nature of all phenomena?” Emptiness is seen as a definitive truth that provides a conclusive resolution to our search for Truth or Reality. By interpreting emptiness in this way, we think of it as a response that decisively settles our questions of existence. Thus, as the ultimate truth and final answer to our deepest concerns, emptiness is deemed worthy of our veneration and belief.

We can also interpret emptiness as a question. In this perspective, emptiness does not provide a simple response to our inquiries into the nature of existence but instead functions to reflect back the beliefs, assumptions, and preconceptions that underlie our desire to know the true nature of existence. Emptiness merely acts as an antidote to our delusions: our self-grasping mind supposes the existence of things and emptiness negates that existence, leaving us in the original groundless position of not knowing what exists. Rather than conveying new information or new realizations, emptiness simply mirrors ourself back to ourself thereby re-presenting our original doubts and desires. In this way, emptiness is asking all the big questions that we are seeking answers to: Who am i? What is the purpose of life? What is the true nature of existence? Thus, as a question, emptiness acts to confront and neutralize all our beliefs that we assume to be true answers – including the belief that emptiness is an answer.

Although both these perspectives can be beneficial, it seems to me that emptiness is most fundamentally a question that functions to oppose and break down all our dogmatic answers. It does not tell us anything about the world we live in but challenges all our assumptions about that world. This provocative and deconstructive nature of emptiness is what gives it vitality and makes it relevant to our spiritual development. By adopting a spiritual practice based on (the experience of) emptiness we commit ourself to facing and wrestling with all the complicated and profound questions that life presents. We humbly admit that there are no easy answers and that all conclusions are ultimately unreliable.

This is why a dogmatic belief in emptiness is such a betrayal to its spirit. By allowing ourselves to accept ‘emptiness’ as an answer to all the wonderful questions of life, we assume that all the great questions have been resolved, which in turn makes us spiritually complacent. We reify emptiness as a concept and proceed to believe in it instead of experiencing it. This causes our spiritual practice to degenerate from a method of directly engaging with life to a form of worship that idolizes direct experience as a distant and abstract ideal.

We can reinvigorate our spiritual practice by approaching emptiness as a question that is constantly probing our subconscious beliefs and forcing us to face life with an open and receptive mind, free from preconception and prejudice. Emptiness is not telling us who we really are, it is asking us who we really are – and it will never stop asking. The only convincing way to answer the question of emptiness is through action. In the end, our understanding of emptiness is demonstrated by who we are and what we do, not by the doctrines we adhere to.

The Emptiness of Emptiness

2006-08-19T08:27:00.000-04:00

I had a direct and profound experience of emptiness this week, which was triggered by a statement in Heart of Wisdom (by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso):

"Although emptiness itself is an ultimate truth, the generic image of emptiness is a conventional truth."

This one sentence reveals many insights about the nature of emptiness and can be considered the heart of all the emptiness teachings. At first glance it may appear self-evident and unimportant but when juxtaposed with other aspects of emptiness, it can lead to deep insight.

This quote seems to indicate that there is a conventional truth (the generic image of emptiness) which refers to an ultimate truth (emptiness itself). This is how we usually understand the relationship between concepts and their objects; the former refers to the latter. For example, we would say that the concept ‘car’ refers to the actual car and the concept ‘space’ refers to an actual space. Likewise, the concept ‘emptiness’ refers to actual emptiness.

However, this ordinary use of referential concepts is not acceptable by someone with experience of emptiness. For a view grounded in emptiness, everything is ‘mere name’, with the implication that names and concepts do not necessarily point to other ‘real’ phenomena. Rather than receiving their meaning from the more substantial objects that they supposedly refer to, names and concepts receive their meaning from their relationships with other names and concepts. Their meaning is therefore simply the result of their unique place in the context of other names and concepts.

This means that, for someone who understands the meaning of emptiness, the concept of emptiness does not refer to an actual emptiness that exists beyond the web of conceptual relationships but that emptiness is also ‘mere name’, lacking any independent, substantial reality. If we apply this insight to the above quote, we will see that our initial interpretation of it is radically altered. Now, ‘emptiness itself’ is seen to be a hypothetical, substantially real emptiness that is referred to by the generic image of emptiness. This ‘real’ emptiness is merely imagined by a mind of self-grasping; it is an inherently existent emptiness. When we realize that this presumed emptiness does not exist, we are left with an experience of the emptiness of emptiness, in which there is no emptiness, no ultimate truth, and phenomena have no ultimate nature. Everything is conventional, including emptiness; there are no ultimate truths. Things just are as they are: suchness.

If this realization is conceptualized it can be called a realization of emptiness but we should not be misled into believing that there is something being realized. It is the realization that there is nothing to realize. How obvious!

Madhyamika Humor

2006-08-08T11:09:00.000-04:00

I came across this great joke on another blog:

Q: How many Prasangika-Madhyamikas does it take to screw in a lightbulb?
A: Four. One to screw it in, one to not screw it in, one to both screw it in and not screw it in, and one to neither screw it in nor not screw it in.

Ultimate Truth

2006-08-08T05:38:00.000-04:00

Why is emptiness considered to be ultimate truth? To a student of Buddhism who has experienced the undeniable immanence of emptiness, this may seem like a trivial and naïve question but if we look into it with an open mind the answer is not so clear.

If we assume that emptiness is the lack of inherent existence (or lack of essence) of any phenomenon and that this absence does indeed exist – i.e. it is true – what makes this truth an ‘ultimate’ truth? For instance, there are many true facts about a car: it has four wheels, it has weight, it does not have wings, and it does not have inherent existence. So, why is one of these facts granted special status? Why is the fact that phenomena lack inherent existence elevated to the status of ‘ultimate’ when all other true facts about phenomena are relegated to the level of ‘conventional’ truths?

Our instinctual response to this question is that emptiness is ultimate truth because it is the true nature of phenomena. This reflects our normal interpretation of the term ‘ultimate truth’ but this meaning is not consistent with the Madhyamaka view. Outside the Madhyamaka, the term ‘ultimate truth’ is normally used to indicate a phenomenon’s essence, or true nature. It is meant to pick out the most fundamental property of an object. For example, for an idealist, the ultimate truth of anything is that thing’s ideal form. That ideal represents an object’s most perfect and essential characteristic. Similarly, the Greek atomists believed that the essence, or ultimate truth, of all physical objects was that they were composed of atoms. Thus, if we were to use ‘ultimate truth’ in this sense we would be saying that emptiness is the essence, or true nature, of all phenomena. Although this is a common belief in Buddhism, i believe that it betrays a misunderstanding of emptiness.

If emptiness were the essence of phenomena, then we would have to conclude that phenomena do have ultimate existence. We would be saying that a phenomenon’s ultimate existence is its emptiness. For instance, when we perform an ultimate search in an attempt to discover whether or not a phenomenon has inherent existence, we would find that it does have inherent existence – the existence of emptiness – rather than simply finding nothing. We would find something (emptiness) that could be pointed to as the real nature of that phenomenon. However, the student of emptiness will correctly argue that this ‘thing’ that we claim to ‘find’ is not actually emptiness but rather the conceptual reification of a mere absence. Like Chandrakirti said, it is like walking into an empty shop, being told that there is nothing for sale, and then asking the shopkeeper if we can buy that ‘nothing’. Emptiness is not something that can be found existing within phenomena; it is the mere fact that nothing will ever be found. Thus it is not acceptable to claim that emptiness is the essence or true nature of phenomena because, according to emptiness, nothing is the essence or true nature of phenomena. In other words, if it is indeed true that all things lack inherent existence, then we cannot substitute emptiness in for that lack of essence. If things have no essence, then emptiness cannot be the essence of things.

This is a very subtle point that often causes confusion for students of emptiness. Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti provide extensive analyses of philosophical concepts in an attempt to refute the possibility of any ultimate truth. Then, they turn around and say that this fact – that there are no ultimate truths – is itself an ultimate truth! This paradoxical twist is both brilliant and bewildering. It would appear that these two ideas cannot coexist: either there are no ultimate truths (and therefore emptiness is not an ultimate truth) or emptiness is ultimate truth (and therefore there is one ultimate truth). However, we may be able to make sense of this conundrum if we reconsider what the Madhyamaka means by ‘ultimate truth’.

Lets assume that the lack of inherent existence can be expressed with the statement, “There are no ultimate truths.” In this context, when a Madhyamika philosopher uses the term ‘ultimate truth’ to indicate emptiness, he is not referring to the essential nature of phenomena because he is already aware that there is no such nature. In other words, by proving that phenomena have no inherent nature, he has proven that they have no ultimate nature, and so he cannot be using ‘ultimate truth’ to refer to a phenomenon’s ultimate nature. By refuting the possibility of any ultimate truth, the term ‘ultimate truth’ becomes meaningless to him and so he is free to use it with a radically different interpretation. The Madhyamika scholar is not restricted to an ordinary usage of the term ‘ultimate truth’ because he rejects the presumed foundation on which that interpretation is based. For him, phenomena have no essential qualities so it is meaningless to use ‘ultimate truth’ to refer to the essence of phenomena. So, how does the Mahyamaka interpret ‘ultimate truth’?

In Heart of Wisdom, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso provides a definition and explanation of ultimate truth. Perhaps what is most interesting and relevant is not what is said but what is not said in this commentary. For instance, Geshe-la never says that emptiness is an ultimate truth because it is the true nature of phenomena. The closest he comes to this is saying that emptiness is ‘ultimate’ because it “opens the door of liberation.” This casts emptiness in a significantly different light. Instead of saying that emptiness is how things really exist (which is our normal view of ultimate truth), he is saying that emptiness is ultimate truth because of the effect it has on our mind. With this perspective, it might be more helpful to label emptiness as an ultimate experience rather than an ultimate truth.

I think this reveals the true purpose of meditating on emptiness. Our study and practice of emptiness is not meant to lead us to a deeper and deeper conviction of what is objectively true and false but rather to lead us to a deeper and deeper experience of liberation and enlightenment. By meditating on emptiness we are attempting to alter our moment-by-moment experience of life, which only occurs when one is continually immersed in emptiness. By satisfying ourselves with a conceptual belief that emptiness represents “how things really are,” we remain neutral observers of that supposed objective truth, alienated from the very experience of liberation that is the heart and soul of emptiness.

By rejecting inherent existence, the Madhyamaka view denies the existence of an objective and independent reality. It says that there are no concrete, findable things ‘out there’. However, this ‘view’ can only be fully understood if it is experienced directly; as long as the practitioner is relates to emptiness indirectly, through conceptual representation, he will not have realized its true purpose and meaning. This leads the Madhyamaka to interpret ‘ultimate truth’ as that which induces the experience of enlightened reality. Thus, the association of emptiness with ultimate truth is intended as a pragmatic device to point the student in the direction of the desired experience; it is not intended as a ontological statement.

By labelling emptiness as ‘ultimate truth’, Nagarjuna is basically saying that if we want to effect the experience of an enlightened being we should head in the direction of emptiness. He is not saying, “This is how things really exist;” he is saying, “If you want to know how things really exist, go that way.” There is a subtle but important difference between these two. In this way, the Madhyamaka uses the term ‘ultimate truth’ as like a spiritual road sign showing the traveller where to go – toward a direct realization of emptiness. But the sign does not say specifically what the traveller will find when he gets there because that is a matter of subjective experience.

The Self-Destruction of Emptiness

2006-08-06T06:22:00.000-04:00

I have recently been discussing the question of whether emptiness is a philosophical 'view' or not with my friends Matt and Mike. It becomes more and more interesting the more we delve into it. The book Buddhist Religions sheds some light on the issue. In it the authors say that it was actually Chandrakirti (not Nagarjuna) who first claimed that a philosopher of emptiness could not maintain a position or 'view' if he wanted his words and actions to be consistent with his philosophical beliefs. In other words, Chandrakirti said that it was not enough to believe in emptiness as a philosophy, one also needed to embody the meaning of emptiness in one's thoughts and deeds, especially when discussing emptiness with philosophers. The belief in emptiness is a view, just like any other belief in what ultimate truth is, but the actual embodiment of emptiness entailed relinquishing any and all views, including the view of emptiness. The authors note that this contradicted Nagarjuna because "Nagarjuna had taught the necessity of views on the conventional level on the grounds that, if one did not have a view that encouraged the deconstruction of attachment to views, one would have no reason to accept the deconstructionist approach to begin with." So, for Nagarjuna it was necessary to have a view, conventionally, even though all views are ultimately non-existent.

If we accept this perspective, there are two important consequences that should be noted. First, Chandrakirti's claim that a Madhyamika philosopher cannot adopt a 'view' or a position of emptiness in the context of debate (which was originally levelled against Bhavaviveka and the Svatantrika approach) is false. Although we cannot say that our adopted view is ultimately true, according to Nagarjuna we must adopt a view (conventionally) in order to engage in debate and demonstrate to our opponent the meaning of emptiness. This means that Chandrakirti's belief that a realization of ultimate truth should not be expressed and embodied in a particular conventional form is also false. (Indeed, one could say that Chandrakirti's refusal to take a stand was itself a position: a position of refusing to take a position.) A realization of emptiness does not imply or induce any specific thoughts, actions, or beliefs. All conventional manifestations are equally empty and no view has a privileged relationship with ultimate truth. This is the second consequence of Nagarjuna's view of emptiness: all conventional truths are potential paths to a realization of ultimate truth. (I don't know if Nagarjuna would agree with this but it seems to be a logical consequence to me.) By contemplating and meditating on emptiness we can develop an experience of ultimate truth but this experience is not necessarily approached through the concept of emptiness; other conventional phenomena can be employed to induce an experience of ultimate truth.

This leads me to wonder what makes the concept of emptiness different from other ideas of ultimate truth. If we accept that the concept of emptiness (which is a conventional truth) does not have a special relationship with ultimate truth (even though it may purport to represent ultimate truth), then what makes emptiness unique? It does seem to have some unique properties beyond the fact that it appears to point to ultimate truth, as many concepts attempt to do. We might assume that it is unique because it points to a unique entity, i.e. that the object that it refers to is a unique object. However, this is unacceptable for two reasons. First, all concepts supposedly refer to unique objects. In this sense, all concepts are unique but that is not what makes emptiness special. Second, for the Madhaymaka, concepts are not seen to get their meaning from reference to an objective entity but rather they are 'mere names' that derive their meaning from their relationship with each other. Thus, emptiness is not seen as referring to, or pointing to, a 'real' emptiness and so its uniqueness cannot be attributed to its referent object.

It seems to me that emptiness is unique because it is self-destructive. Emptiness recommends the deconstruction of all phenomena (i.e. the deconstruction of the belief in the inherent existence of all phenomena). Considering that emptiness is supposed to be ultimate truth, this breaking down of phenomena is not so unusual. Whenever something is presented as 'ultimate truth' (in a philosophy, religion, etc.) it is usually compared to other phenomena in order to show how that concept of truth is qualified to be labelled 'ultimate'. By reorganizing phenomena into a subordinate role in relation to this new ultimate truth, the philosopher has shown how all phenomena (except his exalted ultimate truth) are not ultimate truths. He has demonstrated how all those phenomena are not ultimate but rather conditional, dependent upon his one ultimate truth. In effect, he has deconstructed the belief in inherent existence of all phenomena except one. This can be clearly seen in the case of the common concept of God. God is held up as the ultimate truth and all other phenomena are subordinated to Him because nothing can be greater than God. By introducing this hierarchy between God and the rest of phenomena, everything except God is denied ultimate existence; that is, everything else is deconstructed. Most philosophies are based on this belief of one inherently existent truth (i.e. one ultimate truth) and a collection of other lesser truths.

Emptiness is similar in that it deconstructs, or denies the (ultimate) truth of, all other phenomena. This is most clearly seen in the writings of Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti where all philosophical views are individually refuted. So, in this sense, emptiness is no different from any other concept of ultimate truth; like all other views, it denies ultimate truth to other phenomena. Thus, the thing that makes emptiness unique is not how it relates to other phenomena.

What makes emptiness unique is how it relates to itself. Not only does emptiness deny the ultimate validity of other views, it also denies the ultimate truth of itself. Emptiness deconstructs all other views by showing how they are logically impossible but what makes emptiness special is that it applies the same process of deconstruction to itself to show that even emptiness (as a conventional view) is not ultimate truth. Whereas other philosophies deny the ultimate truth of everything except their one cherished belief and then assume that that 'ultimate truth' cannot be refuted, emptiness refutes all other views and itself. Thus, emptiness is self-destructive. It presents a view of ultimate truth but that very view must be destroyed in order to realize ultimate truth. This does not mean that the view of emptiness must be destroyed and replaced by another view, it means that all views, including itself, must be destroyed. Therefore, what makes emptiness unique is not its relationship to other views but rather its relationship to itself. Other concepts of ultimate truth attempt to maintain their integrity; they attempt to be complete and indestructible. Indeed, this holistic and indestructible nature is supposed to be what makes them ultimate truths. However, as we know, this is precisely what causes them to be vulnerable to the reasoning of emptiness. It is the presumed indestructibility of a phenomenon that leads one to a belief in its inherent existence. Emptiness, on the other hand, doesn’t contain this internal cohesion. Emptiness openly admits that it will break down when analysed. It doesn't pretend to present a logically consistent, irrefutable entity. Emptiness confidently says to us, "This is ultimate truth!" and then smiles and says, "Actually, i was just kidding."

This admitted lack of internal consistency is what makes emptiness unique. In fact, all phenomena contain this inconsistency (as demonstrated by Nagarjuna’s and Chandrakirti’s refutations) but we don’t usually recognize it. What makes emptiness special is not the existence of its inconsistency but rather the inclusion of its inconsistency within the meaning of emptiness. The concept of a car, for example, is internally inconsistent (i.e. it lacks inherent existence) but that inconsistency is not included in the meaning of 'car' – although it is included in the meaning of 'empty car'.

Although emptiness may be unique among philosophical concepts in terms of its self-destructiveness, it would be mistaken to think that no other concepts function in the same way as emptiness. If we assume that the function of emptiness is to deconstruct our beliefs, it is possible to find many other concepts that perform the same function. For example, 'the sound of one hand clapping' is a concept that if meditated on repeatedly will act to deconstruct all our beliefs. That is precisely how this koan is used in Zen. Like emptiness, 'the sound of one hand clapping' is a concept that may at first appear to refer to an actual phenomenon but which eventually functions to destroy our deluded belief that there is an inherent reality to refer to. Ideas like this that act to break down our belief in objective reality can often be found in poetry. One famous example is William Blake's:

To see a world in a grain of sand
And heaven in a wild flower
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
And eternity in an hour.

The concept of 'eternity in an hour' (among others) has the same deconstructive function as emptiness because it breaks down our normal beliefs about how things 'really are'.

One of the things that i find interesting about these examples is that they could clearly be perceived and interpreted in several different ways by different minds. The koan could be interpreted as 'pure nonsense' by an ordinary person, as confusing by a logician, as enlightening by a Buddhist, or as a hilarious joke by a Zen master. This means that the koan's function of deconstructing the student's beliefs is not inherent in the koan. The koan will only function as a method of deconstruction for the person who has the intention of breaking down their beliefs. For someone without that intention, it will not function in the same way. This means that the koan's ability to induce realization in the meditator is a direct reflection of the meditator's desire for realization.

This is a bit more controversial when it comes to emptiness, but the same principle applies. Emptiness can function to deconstruct our beliefs about reality but whether or not emptiness actually performs that function depends on the mind observing it. For someone who is intent on deconstructing their beliefs and experiencing ultimate truth, emptiness will help them accomplish that goal. However, for someone who does not have the intention of eliminating their beliefs, emptiness will not function to deconstruct their views and thus not lead to ultimate truth. For that person, emptiness will function to confirm and strengthen their views. As Buddhists, this is not our normal view. Usually, we think that emptiness will automatically lead people to genuine realizations – even though it may take a long time. We assume that the very nature of emptiness is to lead us to ultimate truth. But this is misguided. Emptiness has the potential to lead us to enlightenment, but it could alternatively be interpreted in many other ways, as in the case of the koan. It all depends on the intention of the practitioner. Indeed, i believe that many people use emptiness to support their innate beliefs rather than using it to deconstruct those beliefs. This happens either because most people don't sincerely want to become enlightened or because they believe that in order to become enlightened its not necessary to dismantle their current beliefs. We assume that if someone is meditating on emptiness that they are automatically getting closer to a realization of ultimate truth. But what if they have approached emptiness (or Buddhism in general) simply as an escape from ordinary life? What if someone has become a Buddhist in order to avoid the pain of his mother's death? If he has built up a belief system that keeps him from dealing with his grief, he will certainly not meditate on emptiness with the intention of dismantling that belief system. So how can we say that emptiness is helping him approach enlightenment?

Can Emptiness Be an Affirming Negative?

2006-07-16T04:32:00.000-04:00

The essential meaning of emptiness is that no phenomenon exists as an independent entity. One aspect of this view is that minds and their objects are interdependent. This means that the existence of any “object” is directly related to the state of the mind observing it, and vice-versa. For example, one person may see a woman and develop love whereas another person will see the same woman and develop hatred. The reason that the same woman can be perceived in different ways (by different minds) is that the she lacks inherent existence. If she were inherently existent, the woman would always be perceived in the same way, by every mind.

The Prasangika school is very skillful at showing how most phenomena lack inherent existence but it sometimes fails to apply the same understanding to emptiness itself. Emptiness is a phenomenon that also lacks inherent existence. The essential meaning of this is that emptiness will appear differently from different perspectives. Since emptiness lacks inherent existence, its appearance is directly related to the state of the mind observing it. Thus, a different state of mind will perceive emptiness differently. This insight alters the normal, literal interpretation of Prasangika tenets.

For example, emptiness is always classified as a non-affirming negative by the Prasangika school and any suggestion that it could be an affirming negative is vigorously denied. However, if emptiness is indeed empty, then its classification as a non-affirming negative must reflect the view of a particular mind and so a different state of mind could justifiably classify emptiness differently; from a different perspective emptiness might possibly appear as an affirming negative. In order to understand how emptiness could appear as an affirming negative we need to understand the distinction between affirming and non-affirming negatives and the state of the mind that classifies phenomena as one or the other.

First of all, we need to understand the Prasangika interpretation of negatives. In this school, negative phenomena are those that are realized through negating something else. For example, if we think of money we realize a positive phenomenon. By negating money we realize a negative phenomenon – "non-money" or "lack of money". This is relatively straightforward but the essential point is that a negative phenomenon is a reflection of how a mind realizes its object. There are no objective negative phenomena, only phenomena that are realized by means of a negation.

Having distinguished between positive and negative phenomena, the Prasangika then divides negative phenomena into affirming negatives and non-affirming negatives. Briefly, affirming negatives are negative phenomena that, when realized, induce a subsequent realization of another (positive) phenomenon whereas non-affirming negatives do not induce any other realization. Put simply, non-affirming negatives are the mere realization of a negation without any implications. A realization of a non-affirming negative is simply the realization of that thing and nothing else. On the other hand, affirming negatives indicate that the negation carries an implication which will be realized as a direct result of the negation. Basically, an affirming negative implies something else whereas a non-affirming negative does not.

(It should be mentioned that it is logically consistent to say that positive phenomena could also be classified as affirming and non-affirming – and that it might be more convenient to speak of affirming and non-affirming phenomena, rather than just negatives – although the Prasangika generally avoids this aspect of the discussion.)

A non-affirming negative is the realization of one thing – that particular negation. We could call it a singular realization because nothing else is realized; the mind simply realizes an absence or a lack without drawing any further conclusions from it. In general, most realizations are non-affirming. We simply realize the object of mind without consequentially realizing anything else. For example, if we see an empty table and realize that there is no food on the table we have realized a negative (lack of food) which is non-affirming. Similarly, the realizations of no water, no clouds, lack of money, or lack of energy are all non-affirming, in general. However, in specific situations these non-affirming negatives can transform into affirming negatives. For example, the realization that there is no food on the table could induce the realization that the food is in the refrigerator; the realization that there is no water in my glass could induce the realization that dinner has not yet been served; and the realization of lack of money could induce the realization that i have been stolen from. By contemplating these examples it is possible to understand how all negatives can be either non-affirming or affirming depending on the context in which they are realized.

This is not the normal Prasangika understanding of negatives. Usually, in the Prasangika school, a negative phenomenon is thought to be either (always) affirming or (always) non-affirming. So, an affirming negative is always affirming and a non-affirming negative is always non-affirming, regardless of its "context". A non-affirming negative cannot "transform into" an affirming negative. However, with a closer look at the relationship between a negative phenomenon and its context we will see how it can change from non-affirming to affirming.

In order to understand how a negative which is usually non-affirming can "transform" into an affirming negative, we need to examine the context of affirming negatives. First of all, affirming negatives are necessarily the negation of something. Upon closer examination it is clear that the object of negation is a particular type of phenomena; it is always one of only two possibilities. This is precisely what makes the negation affirm something else. One possibility is negated and thus the other possibility is affirmed. If there are three or more possibilities and one is negated, there would still be two or more options available and so there could not be a definite affirmation. If i say that the light switch is not on, you know that it is off. The switch's being "not on" is an affirming negative because it induces the realization that the switch is off. It induces this realization because there are only two possibilities - on and off – and one of them is negated. However, if i say that the switch for a fan (which could be on low, medium, or high) is not on low, although this is a negation it is not an affirming negative because it does not induce a subsequent realization. The reason it does not induce a subsequent realization is that the negation leaves open the possibility of two other options (medium and high) and so a definite affirmation is not possible. In short, affirming negatives only exist when the object of negation is one of only two possibilities.

This is supported by a glance at the examples that the Prasangika uses for explaining affirming negatives. The most familiar example (used by Geshe-la) may be "my cousin's lack of being female" (in Heart of Wisdom) which is a negation that affirms the realization that my cousin is male. Obviously, someone's cousin must be either male or female and so the negation of one affirms the realization of the other. The Prasangika also uses examples like the opposite of non-pot and a fat man's not eating during the day. These examples all conform to the stipulation that an affirming negative must negate one of only two possible choices.

What makes this study of negatives interesting and relative to my main point is that they are a direct reflection of the mind that realizes them. This is most clearly seen in the case of affirming negatives. An affirming negative can only exist in a situation where there are only two possibilities. But different minds will be aware of different possibilities so there are no absolute affirming negatives which hold for all minds. Every affirming negative is affirming only for a particular mind or type of mind. For example, the negative "my cousin is not female" is an affirming negative only for a mind that knows that a human must be either male or female. This might seem unimportant since everyone who reads Heart of Wisdom will certainly know that someone's cousin must be male or female, but the point is that this "information" must be present in the mind in order for the negation to affirm a subsequent realization. If this information is not present in the mind that realizes "cousin's not being female", the realization that "cousin is male" will not occur. (One might think that it is impossible to conceive of a mind that understands "cousin's not being female" but not be able to draw the inference that "cousin is male" but i think the minds of some children qualify for this category. There are stages of a child's developing mind when they understand negations (e.g. not boy, not mother, not food) but do not yet understand the implications of those negations.) This "information" which limits the realm of possibilities to only two choices is the mental context in which the negative is realized. If the mind that realizes the negation hasn't framed it in the context of these two choices it will not subsequently realize another phenomenon and so the realization would be considered non-affirming rather than affirming. Thus, the distinction between affirming and non-affirming negatives depends on the information or knowledge possessed by the realizing mind, not on the particular phenomenon that is realized.

Perhaps this can be clarified with an example. Imagine that John and Mary work together and they decide to ask their boss, Michelle, for a raise. So, they both go looking for Michelle. On their way to Michelle’s office they bump into two co-workers, Chris and Sarah. John asks Chris if he knows where Michelle is while Mary asks Sarah the same question. Chris tells John that Michelle is either in her office or having lunch with clients while Sarah simply tells Mary that she doesn’t know where Michelle is. John and Mary then continue on their way to Michelle’s office. They look inside and discover that Michelle is not in her office. Both John and Mary realize a negative phenomenon: “lack of Michelle” in her office. However, this negation is an affirming negative for John but a non-affirming negative for Mary because their minds contain different knowledge which provides a different context for the realization. John knows (from Chris) that Michelle must be in one of two places – her office or out to lunch – and by negating one he automatically realizes the other. For him, Michelle’s absence in her office is an affirming negative because it induces the realization that she is out to lunch. Mary’s mind, however, does not contain the same information and so finding a lack of Michelle in her office does not induce any other realization; her mind simply realizes that Michelle is not there. Thus, the same negative phenomenon can be either affirming or non-affirming.

So, it should be clear that negative phenomena (or all phenomena) can only be classified as affirming or non-affirming in dependence upon the mind that realizes the negation. With this understanding we can now look at how this relates to emptiness. The Prasangika always classifies emptiness as a non-affirming negative. In general, we can say that this is a valid description of the mind that realizes emptiness. When a mind realizes emptiness, it will simply realize that negative phenomenon without subsequently realizing anything else. But could there be special cases in which the mind that realizes emptiness subsequently realizes another phenomenon? Could there be a mind that contains specific knowledge that would transform emptiness into an affirming negative?

We know that, hypothetically, if emptiness were to be an affirming negative it would have to be realized in a specific mental context. In other words, the object of negation of emptiness (inherent existence) would have to be understood as one of only two possibilities. If a mind possessed this form of knowledge, the realization of emptiness would be framed in such a way as to induce a subsequent realization and emptiness would have to be classified as an affirming negative. Are there any instances in the Prasangika philosophy in which inherent existence is presented as one of only two possibilities??

In Heart of Wisdom Geshe-la says “…being dependent-related is the direct opposite of being inherently existent.” Although this statement doesn't explicitly say that dependent-relationship and inherent existence are the only two possible states of existence, that is the clear implication. Indeed, does the Prasangika mention any other possible state? If we accept that the Prasangika posits dependent-relationship and inherent existence as the only two possible states of existence, then the mind that contains this knowledge and negates inherent existence will necessarily realize dependent-relationship. For that mind, emptiness is an affirming negative which induces the realization of dependent-relationship.

A more subtle example of Prasangika tenets that cast emptiness as an affirming negative is the view of the two truths as the same nature. Because they are the same nature, the two truths are inseparable (for a non-conceptual direct perceiver). This means that the mind that realizes emptiness directly does not perceive the two truths as separate. Therefore, this non-conceptual direct realization of emptiness (i.e. ultimate truth) must simultaneously realize conventional truths and the union of the two truths. Thus, a direct realization of emptiness affirms a realization of conventional truths. For a mind that knows that the two truths are the same nature, a direct realization of emptiness is an affirming negative.

I believe there are other examples that can be found of depicting emptiness as an affirming negative simply by using Prasangika tenets but hopefully these two are enough to illustrate my point. My main point is that since all phenomena (including emptiness) depend on the mind, they can only be described and classified with respect to the mind that realizes them. Thus, emptiness can be classified as non-affirming in general but, in particular instances, when the mind realizing emptiness contains a specific type of knowledge, it must be classified as an affirming negative. If the Prasangika insists on always classifying emptiness as a non-affirming negative, despite the state of mind realizing it, it is implying that emptiness is not dependent on mind. This is tantamount to saying that emptiness has (some) inherent existence.

The Prasangika's presentation of emptiness as a non-affirming negative simply indicates that it is describing emptiness from the perspective of someone who does not yet have the knowledge that dependent-relationship and inherent existence are "direct opposites" and that the two truths are the same nature. This is important to keep in mind when studying emptiness because we can easily assume that the Prasangika philosophy always represents the perspective of Buddhas. Actually, there are several similar examples in the Prasangika system that indicate that the philosophical tenets often reflect the perspective of ordinary beings, or practitioners who have not realized emptiness directly, and not the perspective of Buddhas. This is not a criticism. There is great wisdom and benefit in presenting a philosophy in such a way that it appears to novices as understandable and attainable rather than presenting it as technically precise but yet incomprehensible (as the view of Buddhas may appear to ordinary beings). We should always bear in mind that every statement and tenet in the Prasangika system (and all philosophies) reflects the perspective of a particular mind and try to understand what that perspective is.

In conclusion, it should be clear that the Prasangika assertion that emptiness is a non-affirming negative should not be interpreted literally. This assertion is valid for particular minds – especially those with little familiarity with emptiness – but not for all minds. From the perspective of some minds, emptiness appears and functions as an affirming negative.