The Emptiness of Emptiness

I had a direct and profound experience of emptiness this week, which was triggered by a statement in Heart of Wisdom (by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso):

"Although emptiness itself is an ultimate truth, the generic image of emptiness is a conventional truth."

This one sentence reveals many insights about the nature of emptiness and can be considered the heart of all the emptiness teachings. At first glance it may appear self-evident and unimportant but when juxtaposed with other aspects of emptiness, it can lead to deep insight.

This quote seems to indicate that there is a conventional truth (the generic image of emptiness) which refers to an ultimate truth (emptiness itself). This is how we usually understand the relationship between concepts and their objects; the former refers to the latter. For example, we would say that the concept ‘car’ refers to the actual car and the concept ‘space’ refers to an actual space. Likewise, the concept ‘emptiness’ refers to actual emptiness.

However, this ordinary use of referential concepts is not acceptable by someone with experience of emptiness. For a view grounded in emptiness, everything is ‘mere name’, with the implication that names and concepts do not necessarily point to other ‘real’ phenomena. Rather than receiving their meaning from the more substantial objects that they supposedly refer to, names and concepts receive their meaning from their relationships with other names and concepts. Their meaning is therefore simply the result of their unique place in the context of other names and concepts.

This means that, for someone who understands the meaning of emptiness, the concept of emptiness does not refer to an actual emptiness that exists beyond the web of conceptual relationships but that emptiness is also ‘mere name’, lacking any independent, substantial reality. If we apply this insight to the above quote, we will see that our initial interpretation of it is radically altered. Now, ‘emptiness itself’ is seen to be a hypothetical, substantially real emptiness that is referred to by the generic image of emptiness. This ‘real’ emptiness is merely imagined by a mind of self-grasping; it is an inherently existent emptiness. When we realize that this presumed emptiness does not exist, we are left with an experience of the emptiness of emptiness, in which there is no emptiness, no ultimate truth, and phenomena have no ultimate nature. Everything is conventional, including emptiness; there are no ultimate truths. Things just are as they are: suchness.

If this realization is conceptualized it can be called a realization of emptiness but we should not be misled into believing that there is something being realized. It is the realization that there is nothing to realize. How obvious!

Madhyamika Humor

I came across this great joke on another blog:

Q: How many Prasangika-Madhyamikas does it take to screw in a lightbulb?
A: Four. One to screw it in, one to not screw it in, one to both screw it in and not screw it in, and one to neither screw it in nor not screw it in.

Ultimate Truth

Why is emptiness considered to be ultimate truth? To a student of Buddhism who has experienced the undeniable immanence of emptiness, this may seem like a trivial and naïve question but if we look into it with an open mind the answer is not so clear.

If we assume that emptiness is the lack of inherent existence (or lack of essence) of any phenomenon and that this absence does indeed exist – i.e. it is true – what makes this truth an ‘ultimate’ truth? For instance, there are many true facts about a car: it has four wheels, it has weight, it does not have wings, and it does not have inherent existence. So, why is one of these facts granted special status? Why is the fact that phenomena lack inherent existence elevated to the status of ‘ultimate’ when all other true facts about phenomena are relegated to the level of ‘conventional’ truths?

Our instinctual response to this question is that emptiness is ultimate truth because it is the true nature of phenomena. This reflects our normal interpretation of the term ‘ultimate truth’ but this meaning is not consistent with the Madhyamaka view. Outside the Madhyamaka, the term ‘ultimate truth’ is normally used to indicate a phenomenon’s essence, or true nature. It is meant to pick out the most fundamental property of an object. For example, for an idealist, the ultimate truth of anything is that thing’s ideal form. That ideal represents an object’s most perfect and essential characteristic. Similarly, the Greek atomists believed that the essence, or ultimate truth, of all physical objects was that they were composed of atoms. Thus, if we were to use ‘ultimate truth’ in this sense we would be saying that emptiness is the essence, or true nature, of all phenomena. Although this is a common belief in Buddhism, i believe that it betrays a misunderstanding of emptiness.

If emptiness were the essence of phenomena, then we would have to conclude that phenomena do have ultimate existence. We would be saying that a phenomenon’s ultimate existence is its emptiness. For instance, when we perform an ultimate search in an attempt to discover whether or not a phenomenon has inherent existence, we would find that it does have inherent existence – the existence of emptiness – rather than simply finding nothing. We would find something (emptiness) that could be pointed to as the real nature of that phenomenon. However, the student of emptiness will correctly argue that this ‘thing’ that we claim to ‘find’ is not actually emptiness but rather the conceptual reification of a mere absence. Like Chandrakirti said, it is like walking into an empty shop, being told that there is nothing for sale, and then asking the shopkeeper if we can buy that ‘nothing’. Emptiness is not something that can be found existing within phenomena; it is the mere fact that nothing will ever be found. Thus it is not acceptable to claim that emptiness is the essence or true nature of phenomena because, according to emptiness, nothing is the essence or true nature of phenomena. In other words, if it is indeed true that all things lack inherent existence, then we cannot substitute emptiness in for that lack of essence. If things have no essence, then emptiness cannot be the essence of things.

This is a very subtle point that often causes confusion for students of emptiness. Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti provide extensive analyses of philosophical concepts in an attempt to refute the possibility of any ultimate truth. Then, they turn around and say that this fact – that there are no ultimate truths – is itself an ultimate truth! This paradoxical twist is both brilliant and bewildering. It would appear that these two ideas cannot coexist: either there are no ultimate truths (and therefore emptiness is not an ultimate truth) or emptiness is ultimate truth (and therefore there is one ultimate truth). However, we may be able to make sense of this conundrum if we reconsider what the Madhyamaka means by ‘ultimate truth’.

Lets assume that the lack of inherent existence can be expressed with the statement, “There are no ultimate truths.” In this context, when a Madhyamika philosopher uses the term ‘ultimate truth’ to indicate emptiness, he is not referring to the essential nature of phenomena because he is already aware that there is no such nature. In other words, by proving that phenomena have no inherent nature, he has proven that they have no ultimate nature, and so he cannot be using ‘ultimate truth’ to refer to a phenomenon’s ultimate nature. By refuting the possibility of any ultimate truth, the term ‘ultimate truth’ becomes meaningless to him and so he is free to use it with a radically different interpretation. The Madhyamika scholar is not restricted to an ordinary usage of the term ‘ultimate truth’ because he rejects the presumed foundation on which that interpretation is based. For him, phenomena have no essential qualities so it is meaningless to use ‘ultimate truth’ to refer to the essence of phenomena. So, how does the Mahyamaka interpret ‘ultimate truth’?

In Heart of Wisdom, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso provides a definition and explanation of ultimate truth. Perhaps what is most interesting and relevant is not what is said but what is not said in this commentary. For instance, Geshe-la never says that emptiness is an ultimate truth because it is the true nature of phenomena. The closest he comes to this is saying that emptiness is ‘ultimate’ because it “opens the door of liberation.” This casts emptiness in a significantly different light. Instead of saying that emptiness is how things really exist (which is our normal view of ultimate truth), he is saying that emptiness is ultimate truth because of the effect it has on our mind. With this perspective, it might be more helpful to label emptiness as an ultimate experience rather than an ultimate truth.

I think this reveals the true purpose of meditating on emptiness. Our study and practice of emptiness is not meant to lead us to a deeper and deeper conviction of what is objectively true and false but rather to lead us to a deeper and deeper experience of liberation and enlightenment. By meditating on emptiness we are attempting to alter our moment-by-moment experience of life, which only occurs when one is continually immersed in emptiness. By satisfying ourselves with a conceptual belief that emptiness represents “how things really are,” we remain neutral observers of that supposed objective truth, alienated from the very experience of liberation that is the heart and soul of emptiness.

By rejecting inherent existence, the Madhyamaka view denies the existence of an objective and independent reality. It says that there are no concrete, findable things ‘out there’. However, this ‘view’ can only be fully understood if it is experienced directly; as long as the practitioner is relates to emptiness indirectly, through conceptual representation, he will not have realized its true purpose and meaning. This leads the Madhyamaka to interpret ‘ultimate truth’ as that which induces the experience of enlightened reality. Thus, the association of emptiness with ultimate truth is intended as a pragmatic device to point the student in the direction of the desired experience; it is not intended as a ontological statement.

By labelling emptiness as ‘ultimate truth’, Nagarjuna is basically saying that if we want to effect the experience of an enlightened being we should head in the direction of emptiness. He is not saying, “This is how things really exist;” he is saying, “If you want to know how things really exist, go that way.” There is a subtle but important difference between these two. In this way, the Madhyamaka uses the term ‘ultimate truth’ as like a spiritual road sign showing the traveller where to go – toward a direct realization of emptiness. But the sign does not say specifically what the traveller will find when he gets there because that is a matter of subjective experience.

The Self-Destruction of Emptiness

I have recently been discussing the question of whether emptiness is a philosophical 'view' or not with my friends Matt and Mike. It becomes more and more interesting the more we delve into it. The book Buddhist Religions sheds some light on the issue. In it the authors say that it was actually Chandrakirti (not Nagarjuna) who first claimed that a philosopher of emptiness could not maintain a position or 'view' if he wanted his words and actions to be consistent with his philosophical beliefs. In other words, Chandrakirti said that it was not enough to believe in emptiness as a philosophy, one also needed to embody the meaning of emptiness in one's thoughts and deeds, especially when discussing emptiness with philosophers. The belief in emptiness is a view, just like any other belief in what ultimate truth is, but the actual embodiment of emptiness entailed relinquishing any and all views, including the view of emptiness. The authors note that this contradicted Nagarjuna because "Nagarjuna had taught the necessity of views on the conventional level on the grounds that, if one did not have a view that encouraged the deconstruction of attachment to views, one would have no reason to accept the deconstructionist approach to begin with." So, for Nagarjuna it was necessary to have a view, conventionally, even though all views are ultimately non-existent.

If we accept this perspective, there are two important consequences that should be noted. First, Chandrakirti's claim that a Madhyamika philosopher cannot adopt a 'view' or a position of emptiness in the context of debate (which was originally levelled against Bhavaviveka and the Svatantrika approach) is false. Although we cannot say that our adopted view is ultimately true, according to Nagarjuna we must adopt a view (conventionally) in order to engage in debate and demonstrate to our opponent the meaning of emptiness. This means that Chandrakirti's belief that a realization of ultimate truth should not be expressed and embodied in a particular conventional form is also false. (Indeed, one could say that Chandrakirti's refusal to take a stand was itself a position: a position of refusing to take a position.) A realization of emptiness does not imply or induce any specific thoughts, actions, or beliefs. All conventional manifestations are equally empty and no view has a privileged relationship with ultimate truth. This is the second consequence of Nagarjuna's view of emptiness: all conventional truths are potential paths to a realization of ultimate truth. (I don't know if Nagarjuna would agree with this but it seems to be a logical consequence to me.) By contemplating and meditating on emptiness we can develop an experience of ultimate truth but this experience is not necessarily approached through the concept of emptiness; other conventional phenomena can be employed to induce an experience of ultimate truth.

This leads me to wonder what makes the concept of emptiness different from other ideas of ultimate truth. If we accept that the concept of emptiness (which is a conventional truth) does not have a special relationship with ultimate truth (even though it may purport to represent ultimate truth), then what makes emptiness unique? It does seem to have some unique properties beyond the fact that it appears to point to ultimate truth, as many concepts attempt to do. We might assume that it is unique because it points to a unique entity, i.e. that the object that it refers to is a unique object. However, this is unacceptable for two reasons. First, all concepts supposedly refer to unique objects. In this sense, all concepts are unique but that is not what makes emptiness special. Second, for the Madhaymaka, concepts are not seen to get their meaning from reference to an objective entity but rather they are 'mere names' that derive their meaning from their relationship with each other. Thus, emptiness is not seen as referring to, or pointing to, a 'real' emptiness and so its uniqueness cannot be attributed to its referent object.

It seems to me that emptiness is unique because it is self-destructive. Emptiness recommends the deconstruction of all phenomena (i.e. the deconstruction of the belief in the inherent existence of all phenomena). Considering that emptiness is supposed to be ultimate truth, this breaking down of phenomena is not so unusual. Whenever something is presented as 'ultimate truth' (in a philosophy, religion, etc.) it is usually compared to other phenomena in order to show how that concept of truth is qualified to be labelled 'ultimate'. By reorganizing phenomena into a subordinate role in relation to this new ultimate truth, the philosopher has shown how all phenomena (except his exalted ultimate truth) are not ultimate truths. He has demonstrated how all those phenomena are not ultimate but rather conditional, dependent upon his one ultimate truth. In effect, he has deconstructed the belief in inherent existence of all phenomena except one. This can be clearly seen in the case of the common concept of God. God is held up as the ultimate truth and all other phenomena are subordinated to Him because nothing can be greater than God. By introducing this hierarchy between God and the rest of phenomena, everything except God is denied ultimate existence; that is, everything else is deconstructed. Most philosophies are based on this belief of one inherently existent truth (i.e. one ultimate truth) and a collection of other lesser truths.

Emptiness is similar in that it deconstructs, or denies the (ultimate) truth of, all other phenomena. This is most clearly seen in the writings of Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti where all philosophical views are individually refuted. So, in this sense, emptiness is no different from any other concept of ultimate truth; like all other views, it denies ultimate truth to other phenomena. Thus, the thing that makes emptiness unique is not how it relates to other phenomena.

What makes emptiness unique is how it relates to itself. Not only does emptiness deny the ultimate validity of other views, it also denies the ultimate truth of itself. Emptiness deconstructs all other views by showing how they are logically impossible but what makes emptiness special is that it applies the same process of deconstruction to itself to show that even emptiness (as a conventional view) is not ultimate truth. Whereas other philosophies deny the ultimate truth of everything except their one cherished belief and then assume that that 'ultimate truth' cannot be refuted, emptiness refutes all other views and itself. Thus, emptiness is self-destructive. It presents a view of ultimate truth but that very view must be destroyed in order to realize ultimate truth. This does not mean that the view of emptiness must be destroyed and replaced by another view, it means that all views, including itself, must be destroyed. Therefore, what makes emptiness unique is not its relationship to other views but rather its relationship to itself. Other concepts of ultimate truth attempt to maintain their integrity; they attempt to be complete and indestructible. Indeed, this holistic and indestructible nature is supposed to be what makes them ultimate truths. However, as we know, this is precisely what causes them to be vulnerable to the reasoning of emptiness. It is the presumed indestructibility of a phenomenon that leads one to a belief in its inherent existence. Emptiness, on the other hand, doesn’t contain this internal cohesion. Emptiness openly admits that it will break down when analysed. It doesn't pretend to present a logically consistent, irrefutable entity. Emptiness confidently says to us, "This is ultimate truth!" and then smiles and says, "Actually, i was just kidding."

This admitted lack of internal consistency is what makes emptiness unique. In fact, all phenomena contain this inconsistency (as demonstrated by Nagarjuna’s and Chandrakirti’s refutations) but we don’t usually recognize it. What makes emptiness special is not the existence of its inconsistency but rather the inclusion of its inconsistency within the meaning of emptiness. The concept of a car, for example, is internally inconsistent (i.e. it lacks inherent existence) but that inconsistency is not included in the meaning of 'car' – although it is included in the meaning of 'empty car'.

Although emptiness may be unique among philosophical concepts in terms of its self-destructiveness, it would be mistaken to think that no other concepts function in the same way as emptiness. If we assume that the function of emptiness is to deconstruct our beliefs, it is possible to find many other concepts that perform the same function. For example, 'the sound of one hand clapping' is a concept that if meditated on repeatedly will act to deconstruct all our beliefs. That is precisely how this koan is used in Zen. Like emptiness, 'the sound of one hand clapping' is a concept that may at first appear to refer to an actual phenomenon but which eventually functions to destroy our deluded belief that there is an inherent reality to refer to. Ideas like this that act to break down our belief in objective reality can often be found in poetry. One famous example is William Blake's:

To see a world in a grain of sand
And heaven in a wild flower
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
And eternity in an hour.

The concept of 'eternity in an hour' (among others) has the same deconstructive function as emptiness because it breaks down our normal beliefs about how things 'really are'.

One of the things that i find interesting about these examples is that they could clearly be perceived and interpreted in several different ways by different minds. The koan could be interpreted as 'pure nonsense' by an ordinary person, as confusing by a logician, as enlightening by a Buddhist, or as a hilarious joke by a Zen master. This means that the koan's function of deconstructing the student's beliefs is not inherent in the koan. The koan will only function as a method of deconstruction for the person who has the intention of breaking down their beliefs. For someone without that intention, it will not function in the same way. This means that the koan's ability to induce realization in the meditator is a direct reflection of the meditator's desire for realization.

This is a bit more controversial when it comes to emptiness, but the same principle applies. Emptiness can function to deconstruct our beliefs about reality but whether or not emptiness actually performs that function depends on the mind observing it. For someone who is intent on deconstructing their beliefs and experiencing ultimate truth, emptiness will help them accomplish that goal. However, for someone who does not have the intention of eliminating their beliefs, emptiness will not function to deconstruct their views and thus not lead to ultimate truth. For that person, emptiness will function to confirm and strengthen their views. As Buddhists, this is not our normal view. Usually, we think that emptiness will automatically lead people to genuine realizations – even though it may take a long time. We assume that the very nature of emptiness is to lead us to ultimate truth. But this is misguided. Emptiness has the potential to lead us to enlightenment, but it could alternatively be interpreted in many other ways, as in the case of the koan. It all depends on the intention of the practitioner. Indeed, i believe that many people use emptiness to support their innate beliefs rather than using it to deconstruct those beliefs. This happens either because most people don't sincerely want to become enlightened or because they believe that in order to become enlightened its not necessary to dismantle their current beliefs. We assume that if someone is meditating on emptiness that they are automatically getting closer to a realization of ultimate truth. But what if they have approached emptiness (or Buddhism in general) simply as an escape from ordinary life? What if someone has become a Buddhist in order to avoid the pain of his mother's death? If he has built up a belief system that keeps him from dealing with his grief, he will certainly not meditate on emptiness with the intention of dismantling that belief system. So how can we say that emptiness is helping him approach enlightenment?