Ultimate Truth

Why is emptiness considered to be ultimate truth? To a student of Buddhism who has experienced the undeniable immanence of emptiness, this may seem like a trivial and naïve question but if we look into it with an open mind the answer is not so clear.

If we assume that emptiness is the lack of inherent existence (or lack of essence) of any phenomenon and that this absence does indeed exist – i.e. it is true – what makes this truth an ‘ultimate’ truth? For instance, there are many true facts about a car: it has four wheels, it has weight, it does not have wings, and it does not have inherent existence. So, why is one of these facts granted special status? Why is the fact that phenomena lack inherent existence elevated to the status of ‘ultimate’ when all other true facts about phenomena are relegated to the level of ‘conventional’ truths?

Our instinctual response to this question is that emptiness is ultimate truth because it is the true nature of phenomena. This reflects our normal interpretation of the term ‘ultimate truth’ but this meaning is not consistent with the Madhyamaka view. Outside the Madhyamaka, the term ‘ultimate truth’ is normally used to indicate a phenomenon’s essence, or true nature. It is meant to pick out the most fundamental property of an object. For example, for an idealist, the ultimate truth of anything is that thing’s ideal form. That ideal represents an object’s most perfect and essential characteristic. Similarly, the Greek atomists believed that the essence, or ultimate truth, of all physical objects was that they were composed of atoms. Thus, if we were to use ‘ultimate truth’ in this sense we would be saying that emptiness is the essence, or true nature, of all phenomena. Although this is a common belief in Buddhism, i believe that it betrays a misunderstanding of emptiness.

If emptiness were the essence of phenomena, then we would have to conclude that phenomena do have ultimate existence. We would be saying that a phenomenon’s ultimate existence is its emptiness. For instance, when we perform an ultimate search in an attempt to discover whether or not a phenomenon has inherent existence, we would find that it does have inherent existence – the existence of emptiness – rather than simply finding nothing. We would find something (emptiness) that could be pointed to as the real nature of that phenomenon. However, the student of emptiness will correctly argue that this ‘thing’ that we claim to ‘find’ is not actually emptiness but rather the conceptual reification of a mere absence. Like Chandrakirti said, it is like walking into an empty shop, being told that there is nothing for sale, and then asking the shopkeeper if we can buy that ‘nothing’. Emptiness is not something that can be found existing within phenomena; it is the mere fact that nothing will ever be found. Thus it is not acceptable to claim that emptiness is the essence or true nature of phenomena because, according to emptiness, nothing is the essence or true nature of phenomena. In other words, if it is indeed true that all things lack inherent existence, then we cannot substitute emptiness in for that lack of essence. If things have no essence, then emptiness cannot be the essence of things.

This is a very subtle point that often causes confusion for students of emptiness. Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti provide extensive analyses of philosophical concepts in an attempt to refute the possibility of any ultimate truth. Then, they turn around and say that this fact – that there are no ultimate truths – is itself an ultimate truth! This paradoxical twist is both brilliant and bewildering. It would appear that these two ideas cannot coexist: either there are no ultimate truths (and therefore emptiness is not an ultimate truth) or emptiness is ultimate truth (and therefore there is one ultimate truth). However, we may be able to make sense of this conundrum if we reconsider what the Madhyamaka means by ‘ultimate truth’.

Lets assume that the lack of inherent existence can be expressed with the statement, “There are no ultimate truths.” In this context, when a Madhyamika philosopher uses the term ‘ultimate truth’ to indicate emptiness, he is not referring to the essential nature of phenomena because he is already aware that there is no such nature. In other words, by proving that phenomena have no inherent nature, he has proven that they have no ultimate nature, and so he cannot be using ‘ultimate truth’ to refer to a phenomenon’s ultimate nature. By refuting the possibility of any ultimate truth, the term ‘ultimate truth’ becomes meaningless to him and so he is free to use it with a radically different interpretation. The Madhyamika scholar is not restricted to an ordinary usage of the term ‘ultimate truth’ because he rejects the presumed foundation on which that interpretation is based. For him, phenomena have no essential qualities so it is meaningless to use ‘ultimate truth’ to refer to the essence of phenomena. So, how does the Mahyamaka interpret ‘ultimate truth’?

In Heart of Wisdom, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso provides a definition and explanation of ultimate truth. Perhaps what is most interesting and relevant is not what is said but what is not said in this commentary. For instance, Geshe-la never says that emptiness is an ultimate truth because it is the true nature of phenomena. The closest he comes to this is saying that emptiness is ‘ultimate’ because it “opens the door of liberation.” This casts emptiness in a significantly different light. Instead of saying that emptiness is how things really exist (which is our normal view of ultimate truth), he is saying that emptiness is ultimate truth because of the effect it has on our mind. With this perspective, it might be more helpful to label emptiness as an ultimate experience rather than an ultimate truth.

I think this reveals the true purpose of meditating on emptiness. Our study and practice of emptiness is not meant to lead us to a deeper and deeper conviction of what is objectively true and false but rather to lead us to a deeper and deeper experience of liberation and enlightenment. By meditating on emptiness we are attempting to alter our moment-by-moment experience of life, which only occurs when one is continually immersed in emptiness. By satisfying ourselves with a conceptual belief that emptiness represents “how things really are,” we remain neutral observers of that supposed objective truth, alienated from the very experience of liberation that is the heart and soul of emptiness.

By rejecting inherent existence, the Madhyamaka view denies the existence of an objective and independent reality. It says that there are no concrete, findable things ‘out there’. However, this ‘view’ can only be fully understood if it is experienced directly; as long as the practitioner is relates to emptiness indirectly, through conceptual representation, he will not have realized its true purpose and meaning. This leads the Madhyamaka to interpret ‘ultimate truth’ as that which induces the experience of enlightened reality. Thus, the association of emptiness with ultimate truth is intended as a pragmatic device to point the student in the direction of the desired experience; it is not intended as a ontological statement.

By labelling emptiness as ‘ultimate truth’, Nagarjuna is basically saying that if we want to effect the experience of an enlightened being we should head in the direction of emptiness. He is not saying, “This is how things really exist;” he is saying, “If you want to know how things really exist, go that way.” There is a subtle but important difference between these two. In this way, the Madhyamaka uses the term ‘ultimate truth’ as like a spiritual road sign showing the traveller where to go – toward a direct realization of emptiness. But the sign does not say specifically what the traveller will find when he gets there because that is a matter of subjective experience.